SHADOW BANKING, FINANCIAL MARKETS,
AND THE REAL ESTATE SECTOR
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I. Overview of Shadow Banking

A. INTRODUCTION. The world’s financial system has been changing
rapidly. A central feature is disintermediation: the removal of banks as
financial intermediaries. The term “shadow banking” is often used as
shorthand to refer to the disintermediated financial system—effectively all
forms of financing that are not bank intermediated.

1. Examples. Shadow banking encompasses structured finance and
securitization, in which financing is indirectly raised by special-purpose
entities (“SPEs”). It also includes financing and financial services provided
by other non-bank financial intermediaries—such as finance companies,
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hedge funds, money-market mutual funds, REITs, 3 securities lenders
engaging in repo lending, and investment banks.

2. Impact. The amount of non-bank intermediated (i.e.,
disintermediated) credit already “rivals” the amount of bank-intermediated
credit to households and businesses. 4 The trajectory of disintermediation
suggests that disintermediated credit will soon, if it does not already, exceed
bank-intermediated credit: the gross amount of disintermediated credit was
estimated to be nearly $20 trillion in March 2008,5 but was estimated at
three times that level—$60 trillion—in December 2011.6

3. Risks and Regulation. The paramount concern posed by the
disintermediated financial system is that it can, if left unregulated, pose
systemic risks to the financial system. 7 Disintermediation makes it much
more likely, for example, that market participants will engage in profitable
but risky transactions, although doing so could externalize harm—including
systemic harm—onto other market participants and even ordinary citizens.8
Notwithstanding that, however, disintermediation can increase financial
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efficiency. 9 The challenge will be to determine how shadow banking should
be regulated to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its risks. 10

B. HOW WILL SHADOW BANKING IMPACT THE REAL ESTATE SECTOR?

Securitization, hedge funds, and REITs are especially relevant to the
real estate sector.

1. Securitization is important both to the housing recovery and to
commercial real estate generally, because it is a critical means of enabling
mortgage-loan originators to regain liquidity to make new loans (which I
will discuss as a means of “funding regeneration”11). A common political
response to the recent financial crisis, however, has been to restrict
securitization.

2. Hedge funds are becoming increasingly important as originators of
mortgage loans, as I’ll discuss.12
3. REITs might also be regarded as part of shadow banking.13 Long
concentrated in U.S. markets, they are becoming increasingly important in
global real estate finance. But REITs are not significant real estate loan
originators or funding regenerators.
9
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II. Funding Origination

A. MORTGAGE-LOAN ORIGINATION

1. Bank Origination. Banks are currently observing very conservative
real estate lending standards. Regulation, such as Basel III, may well
motivate banks to continue observing conservative real estate lending
standards.

2. Non-Bank Origination. When banks observe conservative lending
standards voluntarily or pursuant to regulation that applies only to banks
(qua banks), that provides an opportunity for non-banks to begin competing
in real estate loan origination. For example, hedge funds—directly or
through vehicles (SPEs) that issue securities to raise financing—are now
originating a significant amount of commercial real estate lending in the
United States. I also understand that hedge funds are actively engaged in
acquiring residential mortgage-origination and servicing businesses, which
they expect to be increasingly profitable.

3. Government Roles in Mortgage-Loan Origination.

(i) Governments worldwide are increasingly considering restricting
residential mortgage-loan origination standards. Overly restrictive
origination standards could, of course, impede the housing recovery.
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(ii) In the United States, for example, mortgage lending will be
strongly driven by what is known as the Qualified Mortgage (QM) definition
for making mortgage loans. This definitional limitation is mandated by §
1411 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amends the Truth in Lending Act to
prohibit a lender from making a residential mortgage loan unless the lender
“makes a reasonable and good faith determination . . . that the consumer has
a reasonable ability to repay the loan.”14

Until the definition is finalized, parties cannot estimate credit cost or
availability. This contributes to the conundrum that although today’s low
interest rates and home prices should make housing very affordable, many
ordinary families can’t qualify for mortgage loans. Furthermore, the final
QM definition will strongly impact the availability and cost of credit because
borrowers will have strong incentives to litigate mortgage loans that, in
retrospect, arguably fall outside that definition. Under proposed law, for
example, an ability-to-repay violation would be a defense against
foreclosure; and a lender losing an ability-to-repay lawsuit becomes subject
to “enhanced damages,” which include liability for actual damages, double
finance charges, and all costs. Attempts to finalize the QM definition thus
face an inherent tension between protecting borrowers while ensuring
reasonable credit availability.

One way to help resolve that tension would be to allow a definitional
alternative option for a QM loan, based on the loan-to-value ratio. For
14
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example, there could be a non-exclusive regulatory safe harbor if the
collateral value is at least 1.X times the loan principal. This would be
somewhat analogous to Regulation U of the Federal Reserve, requiring
margin loans secured by margin stock to be collateralized at least 2:1. 15 I am
not suggesting, however, that real estate loans need as much
overcollateralization as margin loans. I understand that residential mortgage
loans in Canada, for example, are keyed to only an 80% maximum loan-tovalue ratio.

(iii) The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) may be
considering further proactively regulating mortgage origination in the United
States. Also, there are worldwide regulatory efforts to impose restrictions
and safety nets for mortgage loans.

(iv) Government may have other roles in mortgage origination—
subject to the caveat that any government role would, of course, affect
private market incentives. Should governments consider, for example,
providing mortgage-loan guarantees, perhaps for early mortgage years,
much as they do for project financing (especially during the risky
construction phase)? Should governments consider making credit available
to mortgage-loan originators to enhance the liquidity of key real estate
markets? 16 Also, given the very long-term nature of typical mortgage loans,
what will be the impact of Basel III’s aversion to short-term “wholesale”
funding to finance loan/asset books? Will mortgage loans be made for
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shorter periods? That may be done already in certain countries, and that
could help to mitigate lending risk (although it increases borrower risk).

B. ALTERNATIVES TO MORTGAGE LOANS

1. Alternative Forms of Access. To what extent will restricted loan
origination motivate alternative forms of “access”—such as leasing and
other non-ownership rights to use real property? Leasing is important in
some non-U.S. markets; and since the financial crisis, leasing of residential
real estate has become increasing important in the U.S.

2. Rental Payments as Financial Assets. As alternative forms of
access grow, one can envision regenerating funding through securitization
(see below). Lease rental payments, for example, are “financial assets,” and
at least theoretically all types of financial assets can be securitized.

III. Funding Regeneration

A. SECURITIZATION

Recall that securitization is important to the housing recovery as well
as to commercial real estate because it is a critical means of enabling
mortgage-loan originators to regain liquidity to make new loans.17 For
example, a mortgage-loan originator that makes $X of mortgage loans can
securitize the loans and regain close to $X of liquidity to make additional
17
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loans. And the additional loans can likewise be securitized, enabling the
mortgage-loan originator to make further additional loans. The cycle can
continue, perhaps enabling a mortgage-loan originator starting with $X to
make, for example, three or four times that amount of loans per year.

1. GSE Securitization. Government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)
securitization is currently the primary domestic source of funding
regeneration, through monetization of mortgage loans. To some extent, this
is driven by regulation: the Dodd-Frank Act, for example, imposes a 5%
minimum unhedged risk-retention (“skin in the game”) requirement for nonGSE mortgage-loan securitizations. 18 To that extent, GSE securitization is
incongruous because it is inconsistent with the goal of the Obama
administration’s white paper on housing finance, of phasing out the GSEs
and enticing more “private capital” into the system.

To some extent, however, GSE securitization reflects a post-financial
crisis move to safety. 19 As later discussed, however, there may be a trend in
today’s financial markets toward increasing tolerance for risk. 20
18
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2. Non-GSE Securitization. It is hard to predict the future of the
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market. However, until that
market is weaned from the GSEs, the level of residential real estate
financing may be limited.

B. COVERED BONDS

1. Covered bonds can also serve, similar to securitization, as a way to
monetize mortgage loans.21 Some covered bond regimes are statutory, some
are contractual. Statutory regimes are generally safer for investors because
they provide legislative safe harbors. The United States does not yet have a
statutory covered bond law.

2. The relationships and differences between securitization and
covered bonds are complex. Although covered bonds are sometimes viewed
by investors as preferable to securitization, covered bonds are more likely
than securitization to harm unsecured creditors of mortgage-loan
originators.22

IV. Controlling Future Real Estate Financing Risk

21

See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Conundrum of Covered Bonds, 66 THE
BUSINESS LAWYER 561 (2011).
22
See id. at 586.

WorldEconomicForum-Oct 3, 2012 Talk.docx

10

No matter how funding origination and funding regeneration are
regulated, there are likely to be future financial failures. That is because
shadow banking can trigger three types of market failures, which regulation
can only address imperfectly: information failure, agency failure, and
responsibility failure (often addressed as externalities).

A. INFORMATION FAILURE

1. Asymmetric Information. By increasing complexity, shadow
banking can cause information failure by making financial transactions and
products more difficult to disclose and understand. In the recent financial
crisis, for example, it appears that neither investors nor even underwriters
always fully understood and appreciated the potential consequences of
complex, highly-leveraged ABS CDO securities, which were largely payable
from securities that themselves were payable from underlying mortgage
loans.

2. Bounded Rationality. Although sometimes categorized separately,
this can be viewed as a subset of information failure.

(i) We have difficulty, for example, appreciating unlikely events that,
if they occur, could have devastating consequences. 23 In this context, note
the parallel between subprime margin loans as a causal factor in the Great
Depression (when the rising stock market collapsed, many of these loans
became undercollateralized), and subprime mortgage loans as a causal factor
23
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in the recent financial crisis (when the rising housing market collapsed,
many of these loans likewise became undercollateralized). In both cases,
observers critically under-appreciated the systemic consequences of a
precipitous drop—unprecedented in then-recent history—in collateral value.

(ii) We also have short memories. Although in late 2008/early 2009,
no investor would buy anything that did not have a government guarantee,
there is a trend in today’s financial markets toward increasing tolerance for
risk. To obtain higher returns, investors—especially hedge funds—are now
buying AAA/Aaa subprime auto and A-rated prime auto paper and are
looking at other asset classes. We now appear to have a vibrant CLO market
for non-mortgage asset classes (which looks in all respects like the old CDO
market with just a different name). 24 Even CMBS is improving, though
RMBS is still uncertain.25

Short memories, however, may not fully explain risk cycles and
today’s market’s increasing tolerance for risk. Other explanations might
include a swing back to normalcy from the earlier overreaction, and a
competitive need of investors to get high returns. 26

B. AGENCY FAILURE

24
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1. By increasing complexity, shadow banking can increase the
potential for agency failure (meaning principal-agent failure, as opposed to
GSE “agency” failure).

2. The biggest problem may not be the traditional agency conflict
between a firm’s owners and senior managers but, instead, the conflict
between a firm’s senior managers and its secondary managers (such as vice
presidents and analysts).27 Because secondary managers are typically paid
on a short-term basis, including yearly bonuses, and they often move from
firm to firm, their interests do not necessarily align with the long-term
interests of their firms. Even more apropos to shadow banking, secondary
managers may well have a better technical understanding of complex
investments and transactions, so they can—and in the recent financial crisis,
often likely did—recommend investments and transactions that generate
high returns, and thus high bonuses to them, even though the investments
and transactions pose real long-term risks to their firms. 28

3. Agency failure is, theoretically, one of the easiest types of failure to
try to manage by regulation.29 But to the extent managers can move to jobs
in different countries, effective regulation will require international
governmental cooperation.

C. RESPONSIBILITY FAILURE
27
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1. Shadow banking also makes it much more likely that market
participants will engage in profitable but risky transactions, although doing
so could externalize harm—including systemic harm—onto other market
participants and even ordinary citizens. Economists would see this as fitting
into the traditional market-failure category of “externalities.”

2. “Externalities,” however, is a counterintuitive and confusing term
for a market-failure category because it conflates cause and effect.
Externalities are consequences, not causes, of market failure. We need to
focus more on the cause of those externalities, which I will call
responsibility failure.30

3. For example, limited liability is an important source of
responsibility failure that can lead to externalities. Because investors in firms
are not personally liable for liabilities of their firms, the interests of investors
may conflict with the interests of their firms and, more importantly for
externalities, with the interests of third parties harmed by their firms. 31

4. By facilitating decentralization, shadow banking makes this form of
responsibility failure much more likely. The relatively small firms that
operate in the disintermediated financial system are often managed directly
30
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responsibility failure).
31
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by their primary investors. Because they typically divide up a significant
share of the firm’s profits, those managers have strong incentives to take
risks that could generate large profits. Yet if a risky action exposes their firm
to significant liability for externalized harm, those managers would not be
liable if the firm cannot pay that liability. They therefore have an incentive
to take outsized risks with their firms, for the chance of outsized gains to
themselves, notwithstanding the potential systemic impact that could result
from their firm’s failure.32

5. This is radically unlike the management incentives in large firms,
such as traditional banks, in which the senior managers tend to share only
indirectly in profits, such as through stock options. Those managers may
also be more invested in maintaining their jobs. They therefore are less
motivated to take actions that risk the firm.

32

To some extent this would be balanced, however, by the failure of a relatively small
firm being less likely to trigger systemic consequences than the failure of a larger firm.
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